The threshold of non-international armed conflicts is a criterion in terms of which the internal disturbances and tensions e.g. riots, and both isolated and sporadic acts of violence, are no longer characterized as civil wars. This term was introduced into the literature of International Law in 1949, following the formation of the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The impact of the above-mentioned concept is directly in connection with the sovereign rights of States, particularly the exclusive jurisdiction of the national judicial authorities. Consequently, its effect on managing the conflicts and dealing with the operations of anti-government armed forces, has always been one of the most controversial parts of different diplomatic conferences, including those led to the creation of the Common Article 3, Article 8 of the Rome Statute and especially the Additional Protocol II to Geneva conventions.

For more than four decades, Article 36 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions has been considered as a norm for assessing the legality of new weapons. The criteria included in this article are based on weapons that were in existence at the time of its adoption. New technologies have brought new weapons which challenged the existing norms. Cyberspace as one of these technologies has capabilities that are used in software or malware forms for causing damages or injuries in the armed conflicts. The question posed here is whether Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I can regulate such capabilities under international humanitarian law? Due to the novelty of these capabilities and the difficulty of naming them as weapons, their legal review is faced with challenges in the light of Article 36 of the Additional Protocol. The review of Article 36, along with the nature of cyberspace capabilities shows that their legal assessment faces challenges such as the lack of rules and regulations that explicitly prohibits or allows explicitly the use of cyberspace, entrusting the definition of weapons to the member States of the Protocol, the definition of new weapons, the non-application of the object to computer data for the perceived cyber-weapons as a weapon, the lack of an international consensus on the virtual effects of the use of cybercriminals, the lack of regulation on the requirement for individuals and groups to produce cyber weapons for legal assessment, and most importantly, the interconnection of military and civilian networks and the possible use of cyber-weapons likely to infect critical civilian networks. Therefore, respecting the fundamental principles of International Humanitarian Law including distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and precautionary measures will be difficult.

Through the peaceful settlement of disputes outlook, the Joint Comprehensive of Action (JCPOA) deals with as a turning point. The issue of granting access to and monitoring via JCPOA on the Iran’ s nuclear activities is growing increasingly sensitive in Iran. Incorporating two specific mechanism in JCPOA, routine and unannounced inspection, upon which the International Energy Atomic Agency (IAEA) is rested with to monitor such an access. The routine inspection in JCPOA is similar to an extent degree to the same inspection included in the IAEA monitoring system of the Safeguard Agreement, Additional Protocol and the modified Code 3. 1. The innovation has been occurred in the JCPOA is pertained to the transparence-derived activities. The challenging, and somehow discriminating, point which may be made here is that the unannounced inspections in the JCPOA is capable of offering an adequate facilitation for potential leaking of Iran’ s nuclear confidential information. With regard to reviewing JCPOA’ s contents, the paper would make an examination to the related instruments in order to reach a conclusion as to the question how the method and qualification of access in the JCPOA would be.

The paper illustrates the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, Additional Protocol and JCPOA, in terms of the inspectors’ access to military sites and the restrictions thereof. The NPT and the comprehensive safeguard agreements have not envisaged any discretionary power for the IAEA regarding the access to military sites of the States Parties. Neither the Addition Protocol has foreseen such a right. JCPOA has a sophisticated and clear provisions but not a right to access to military sites and any such an access is subject to consent and voluntary cooperation of Iran.

In contrast to other ancillary suits (such as competing claims, compulsory presence of a third party, and intervention of a third party), there are no particular regulations in the Iranian Civil Procedural Law to define principles and rules govering “additional claim”. The word “additional” within the context of this term has two meanings. Its general meaning includes any change in the essential elements of the claim, the purpose of the claim, and the reason for the claim, which generally known as “changes in the claim”. In its specific meaning, it refers to a claim submitted under a new demand which is attached to the original claim due to its relation to the original claim. Accordingly, this paper analyses the concept, necessity, conditions and rules govering the additional claim in order to clarify the existing ambiguous points, differences and similarities with the changes in the claim.

Objective(s): Nuclear medicine technologists in Japan often perform additional single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) with or without computed tomography (CT) after whole-body imaging for bone scintigraphy. In this study, we wanted to identify the bone scanning protocols used in Japan, together with the current clinical practices. Methods: The study was conducted between October and December 2017. We created a web survey that was hosted by the Japanese Society of Radiological Technology. The questionnaire included 12 items regarding the demographics of the responders, their scan protocols, and the imaging added to, or omitted from, routine protocols. Results: In total, 228 eligible responses were collected from participants with a mean of 11. 6± 8. 4 years’ experience in nuclear medicine examination. All responders reported using routine scan protocols that included whole-body imaging. However, only 2%, 4%, 20%, and 14% of the responders also acquired single-field SPECT, singlefield SPECT/CT, multi-field SPECT, and multi-field SPECT/CT, respectively. Conclusion: Our survey results indicate that nuclear medicine practice in Japan is beginning to shift from planar whole-body imaging with additional spot planar images to additional SPECT or SPECT/CT. Further study is required to examine the optimal protocols for bone scintigraphy.

War is a phenomenon in which the damage is inevitable and one of the significant losses during armed conflict is the environment. In this respect, humanitarian law protects and takes account of the environment in a few of its regulations. However, these regulations have not given sufficient support to the environment and the question arises whether any prohibitions available in international environmental law are applicable to environmental protection in this case, or should we only use the provisions contained in humanitarian international law for this. In this paper we consider these regulations and the possibility of applying of them to protecting the environment in the event of armed conflict. Damage to the environment during armed conflict may occur intentionally or unintentionally. Intentional damage to the environment occurs when the environment is used as a weapon or damage to the environment is deliberate, but the environment is not used as a weapon. Regulations that have been enacted to protect against these damages contain certain conditions and the fulfilment of these conditions is necessary for incurring damage. Regarding unintentional damage to the environment, the main victim is not the environment, however, and the precautionary principle should be applied. In this regard, it is necessary to consider types of losses, existing prohibitions and possibility of minimizing environmental losses.